主讲人介绍：
Ben Polak教授任职于耶鲁大学管理学院经济系。他在剑桥大学Trinity College获得学士学位，在西北大学获得硕士学位，在哈佛大学获得博士学位。他是微观经济理论和经济史方面的专家。他的论文在Economic Letters、Journal of Economic Theory、Journal of Economic History、Journal of Legal Studies、 Journal of Theoretical and Institutional Economics、Econometrica等学术期刊多次发表。他最近的研究是“广义功利主义和海萨尼的公正观察员定理”和“平均分散的偏好”
课程安排：
1 Introduction: five first lessons 简介：五年前的教训
2 Putting yourselves into other people's shoes 设身处地为他人着想
3 Iterative deletion and the median-voter theorem 迭代删除和位数选民定理
4 Best responses in soccer and business partnerships 最佳反应在足球和商业伙伴关系
5 Nash equilibrium: bad fashion and bank runs 纳什均衡：坏时尚及银行挤兑
6 Nash equilibrium: dating and Cournot 什均衡：约会和诺
7 Nash equilibrium: shopping, standing and voting on a line 纳什均衡：购物，并参加表决的常委会上线
8 Nash equilibrium: location, segregation and randomization 纳什均衡：定位，隔离和随机
9 Mixed strategies in theory and tennis 混合战略的理论和网球
10 Mixed strategies in baseball, dating and paying your taxes 混合战略棒球，约会和支付您的税
11 Evolutionary stability: cooperation, mutation, and equilibrium 进化稳定：合作，突变，与平衡
12 Evolutionary stability: social convention, aggression, and cycles 进化稳定：社会公约，侵略，和周期
13 Sequential games: moral hazard, incentives, and hungry lions 顺序游戏：道德风险，奖励和饥饿的狮子
14 Backward induction: commitment, spies, and first-mover advantages 落后的感应：承诺，间谍，和先行者优势
15 Backward induction: chess, strategies, and credible threats 落后的感应：国际象棋，战略和可信的威胁
16 Backward induction: reputation and duels 落后的感应：声誉和决斗
17 Backward induction: ultimatums and bargaining 落后的感应：最后通牒和讨价还价
18 Imperfect information: information sets and sub-game perfection 不完全信息：信息集和子博弈完美
19 Subgame perfect equilibrium: matchmaking and strategic investments 子博弈完美均衡：招商引资和战略投资
20 Subgame perfect equilibrium: wars of attrition 子博弈完美均衡：战争的消耗
21 Repeated games: cooperation vs. the end game 重复博弈：合作与结局
22 Repeated games: cheating, punishment, and outsourcing 重复博弈：作弊，惩罚和外包
23 Asymmetric information: silence, signaling and suffering education 信息不对称：沉默，信令和苦难教育
